PRO-COMPETITIVE RATIONING IN MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Holmberg, Par
• 署名单位: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); University of Cambridge
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12402
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: F372-F395
• 关键词: Supply function equilibrium; electricity auctions; Divisible goods; spot market; rules; generation; oligopoly; industry; DESIGN

摘要

In multi-unit auctions, it is necessary to specify rationing rules to break ties between multiple marginal bids. The standard approach is to ration marginal bids proportionally. This article shows how bidding can be made more competitive - and the auctioneer can increase his surplus - if the rationing rule instead gives increasing priority to bidders with a small volume of marginal bids at clearing prices closer to the reservation price. As compared to standard rationing, such a rule can, in beneficial circumstances, have almost the same effect on the competitiveness of bids as a doubling of the number of bidders.