The Intergenerational Welfare State and the Rise and Fall of Pay-as-you-go Pensions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andersen, Torben M.; Bhattacharya, Joydeep
• 署名单位: Aarhus University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Iowa State University; Iowa State University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12330
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 896-923
• 关键词: social-security; education

摘要

This article develops a theory of the two-armed intergenerational welfare state, consistent with key features of modern welfare arrangements, and uses it to rationalise the rise and fall in generosity of Pay-as-you-go Pensions solely on efficiency grounds. By using the education arm, a dynamically-efficient welfare state is shown to improve upon long-run laissez faire even when market failures are absent. To release these downstream welfare gains without hurting any transitional generation, help from the pension arm is needed. In the presence of an intergenerational education externality, pensions initially rise in generosity but can be replaced by fully funded pensions eventually.