Gender Differences and Stereotypes in Strategic Reasoning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cubel, Maria; Sanchez-Pages, Santiago
• 署名单位: Brunel University; University of Barcelona; University of London; King's College London
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12488
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 728-756
• 关键词: cognitive hierarchy model; financial incentives; players models; threat; performance; depth; COMPETITION; dominance; women; games

摘要

This article explores the existence and endogeneity of gender differences in strategic behaviour. We report results from two experimental studies employing the beauty contest game, one in the laboratory and one in the classroom. We observe robust and significant gender differences in observed depth of strategic reasoning in favour of men in zero-stake situations. These differences disappear when a monetary prize is awarded. We also find that females engage in more rounds of reasoning than males when gender and stereotypes are made salient. This effect of priming is driven by females who believe women are superior in the game.