Play It Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning From Finitely repeated Dilemma Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis
• 署名单位: Durham University; Brown University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12320
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1069-1095
• 关键词: prisoners-dilemma; rational cooperation

摘要

Often the fuller the reputational record people's actions generate, the greater their incentive to earn a reputation for cooperation. However, inability to wipe clean' one's past record might trap some agents who initially underappreciate reputation's value in a cycle of bad behaviour, whereas a clean slate could have been followed by their reforming' themselves. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate what subjects learn from playing a finitely repeated dilemma game with endogenous, symmetric partner choice. We find that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in cooperative reputation grows following exogenous restarts, although earlier end-game behaviour is observed.