GUARDING THE GUARDIANS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guimaraes, Bernardo; Sheedy, Kevin D.
• 署名单位: Getulio Vargas Foundation; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12379
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 2441-2477
• 关键词: coalition-formation; state capacity; COMMITMENT; POWER; constitutions; institutions; CONFLICT; DYNAMICS; GROWTH; CHOICE

摘要

Good government requires some restraints on the powerful but how can those be imposed if there is no-one above them? This article studies the equilibrium allocation of power and resources established by self-interested incumbents under the threat of rebellions from inside and outside the group in power. Commitment to uphold individuals' rights can only be achieved if power is not as concentrated as incumbents would like it to be, ex post. Power sharing endogenously enables incumbents to commit to otherwise time-inconsistent laws by ensuring more people receive rents under the status quo and thus want to defend it.