Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rasul, Imran; Rogger, Daniel
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London; The World Bank
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12418
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 413-446
• 关键词: incentive contracts; teacher incentives; ORGANIZATIONS; politicians; motivation; INDIA; RISK; PRODUCTIVITY; countries; Indonesia

摘要

We study how the management practices bureaucrats operate under correlate with the quantity of public services delivered, using data from the Nigerian Civil Service. We have hand-coded independent engineering assessments of 4,700 project completion rates. We supplement this with a management survey in the bureaucracies responsible for these projects, building on Bloom and Van Reenen (). Management practices matter: increasing bureaucrats' autonomy is positively associated with completion rates, yet practices related to incentives/monitoring of bureaucrats are negatively associated with completion rates. Our evidence provides new insights on the importance of management in public bureaucracies in a developing country setting.