Information Use and Acquisition in Price-setting Oligopolies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Myatt, David P.; Wallace, Chris
• 署名单位: University of London; London Business School; University of Leicester
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12410
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 845-886
• 关键词: social value; private information; Cournot markets; bertrand equilibria; welfare; COMMUNICATION; duopoly; COORDINATION; COMPETITION; incentives

摘要

Asymmetric price-setting multi-product suppliers have access to multiple sources of information about demand conditions, where the publicity of each source corresponds to the cross-industry correlation of signals received from it. A signal's influence on suppliers' prices is increasing in its publicity as well as in its precision. The emphasis on relatively public information is stronger for smaller suppliers who control narrower product portfolios. When information is endogenously acquired, suppliers listen to only a subset of information sources. This subset is smaller when products are less differentiated and when the industry is less concentrated. Smaller suppliers focus attention on fewer information sources. The inefficiencies arising from information acquisition and use are identified.