Shills and snipes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bose, Subir; Daripa, Arup
• 署名单位: University of Leicester; University of London
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.010
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 507-516
• 关键词: Online auctions; Correlated private values; Last-minute bidding; Sniping; Shill bidding; Random bidder arrival; Continuous bid time; Continuous bid arrival process

摘要

Online auctions with a fixed end-time often experience a sharp increase in bidding towards the end (sniping) despite using a proxy-bidding format. We provide a novel explanation of this phenomenon under private values. We show that it is closely related to shill bidding by the seller. Late-bidding by buyers arises not to snipe each other, but to snipe the shill bids. We allow the number of bidders in the auction to be random and model a continuous bid arrival process. We show the existence of late-bidding equilibrium. Next, we characterize all equilibria under a natural monotonicity condition and show that they all involve sniping with positive probability. We characterize the time at which such late bidding occurs and discuss welfare implications. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.