MARKET STRUCTURE AND BORROWER WELFARE IN MICROFINANCE

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: de Quidt, Jonathan; Fetzer, Thiemo; Ghatak, Maitreesh
• 署名单位: University of Warwick; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12591
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1019-1046
• 关键词: repayment incentives; field experiment; Microcredit; insurance; returns

摘要

Motivated by recent controversies surrounding the role of commercial lenders in microfinance, and calls for regulation of the sector, we analyse borrower welfare under different market structures, considering a benevolent non-profit lender, a for-profit monopolist and a competitive credit market. To understand the magnitude of the effects analysed, we simulate the model with parameters estimated from the MIX Market database. Our results suggest that market power can have severe implications for borrower welfare, while despite possible enforcement externalities competition typically delivers similar borrower welfare to non-profit lending.