Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis and Subjective Evaluation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias
• 署名单位: Free University of Berlin; University of Nottingham
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12472
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1367-1394
• 关键词: strategic information-transmission; health-care; incentive contracts; eliminating waste; price-competition; Payment systems; moral hazard; experts; MARKETS; services

摘要

We study contracting between a consumer and an expert in a credence goods model when: (i) the expert's choice of diagnosis effort is not observable; (ii) the expert might misrepresent his private information about the adequate treatment; and (iii) payments can depend only on the consumer's subjective evaluation of treatment success. We show that the first-best solution can always be implemented if the parties' discount factor is equal to one; a decrease in the discount factor makes obtaining the first-best more difficult. The first-best is also always implementable if separation of diagnosis and treatment is possible.