The Distribution of Talent Across Contests

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Azmat, Ghazala; Moeller, Marc
• 署名单位: University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Bern
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12426
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 471-509
• 关键词: all-pay contests; performance pay; tournaments; COMPETITION; prizes; COMPENSATION; PRODUCTIVITY; allocation; EFFICIENCY; selection

摘要

Do the contests with the largest prizes attract the most able contestants? To what extent do contestants avoid competition? We show that the distribution of abilities is crucial in determining contest choice. Complete sorting exists only when the proportion of high-ability contestants is small. As this proportion increases, high-ability contestants shy away from competition and sorting decreases, making reverse sorting a possibility. We test our theoretical predictions with a large panel data set containing contest choice over 20years. We use exogenous variation in the participation of highly able competitors to provide evidence for the relationship among prizes, competition and sorting.