MATCHING TO SHARE RISK WITHOUT COMMITMENT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gierlinger, Johannes; Laczo, Sarolta
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; University of Surrey; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12490
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 2003-2031
• 关键词: informal insurance arrangements; MARKET; marriage; BEHAVIOR; firm

摘要

This article studies the effect of limited commitment on sorting when two sides of a frictionless market form pairs to share risk. On each side, agents are identical except for their risk preferences. First, we provide analytical results when transfers do not condition on the history of shocks. More risk-averse agents can commit to larger transfers, as long as their consumption is less risky than their endowment. With sufficiently large idiosyncratic risk and sufficient discounting of the future, matching is positive assortative, unlike under full commitment. Second, we find positive-assortative stable matchings when transfers are history dependent, using a numerical algorithm.