Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions Redux

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lu, Jingfeng; Parreiras, Sergio O.
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.005
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 78-91
• 关键词: All-pay auctions; asymmetries; contests; Correlated signals; interdependent valuations

摘要

In this paper, we revisit the two-bidder asymmetric all-pay auction of Amann and Leininger (1996) by allowing interdependent values and correlated signals. Both values and signals are distributed on continuous supports. We provide conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium (MPSE), and constructively characterize the MPSE when it exists. We find that given the marginal distributions of the signals, the equilibrium allocation is solely determined by how bidders' values depend on their signals. In particular, the equilibrium allocation does not depend on how bidders' signals are correlated. (C) 2017 Published by Elsevier Inc.