EFFICIENCY IN DECENTRALISED MARKETS WITH AGGREGATE UNCERTAINTY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Camargo, Braz; Gerardi, Dino; Maestri, Lucas
• 署名单位: Getulio Vargas Foundation; Collegio Carlo Alberto; University of Turin
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/uez053
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 446-461
• 关键词: information

摘要

We study efficiency in non-stationary decentralised markets with common-value uncertainty and correlated asset values. There is an equal mass of buyers and sellers and payoffs from trade depend on an aggregate state, which only the sellers know. Buyers and sellers are randomly and anonymously matched in pairs over time, and buyers make the offers. We show that all equilibria become efficient as trading frictions vanish.