FOOL ME ONCE: AN EXPERIMENT ON CREDIBILITY AND LEADERSHIP

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cooper, David J.; Hamman, John R.; Weber, Roberto A.
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; Florida State University; University of East Anglia; University of Zurich
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaa059
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 2105-2133
• 关键词: Coordination games; global games; COMMUNICATION; reputation; bad; example

摘要

We investigate 'social credibility', a leader's ability to convince followers that conditions are favourable and that others will follow the leader's advice. To do so, we study an experimental joint venture with three key properties: returns are uncertain, investments are complements, and investment is often more beneficial for the leader than the followers. The leader has private information about investment returns and can facilitate coordination through cheap-talk recommendations. We find that leaders manage social credibility by forgoing potentially profitable advice to invest, increasing the likelihood that subsequent recommendations are followed. We identify factors that affect the persistence of social credibility.