INFORMATION AGGREGATION WITH COSTLY REPORTING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Osborne, Martin J.; Rosenthal, Jeffrey S.; Stewart, Colin
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/uez047
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 208-232
• 关键词: model

摘要

A group of privately informed individuals with common interests chooses a binary option. Each individual chooses whether to reveal her signal, at a cost. If the group is large and cannot commit to a decision rule then it takes the correct decision with high probability in one state but with probability bounded away from one in the other. It cannot do better by committing to an anonymous decision rule without transfers, but can achieve the first best if transfers between individuals are possible, and can approximately achieve the first best with a non-anonymous decision rule.