FIRM REPUTATION, INNOVATION AND EMPLOYEE STARTUPS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zabojnik, Jan
• 署名单位: Queens University - Canada
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/uez065
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 822-851
• 关键词: radical product innovation; research-and-development; entrepreneurial activity; spin-offs; strategies; CONTRACTS; KNOWLEDGE; bureaucracy; management; MARKET

摘要

This article studies how a firm's reputation for rewarding innovative employees affects innovation and startup creation. In any Pareto-efficient equilibrium of the repeated game, low-value innovations are developed in-house, while high-value innovations are developed in startups. When distributions of ideas are ordered by simple cases of first- or second-order stochastic dominance, the firm has a preference for an extreme distribution. The article also characterises the optimal relational contract and workers' incentives to invest in innovation. The model's predictions are consistent with a broad set of observed regularities regarding the creation of employee startups.