SIGNALLING BY BAYESIAN PERSUASION AND PRICING STRATEGY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Yanlin; Zhang, Jun
• 署名单位: Nanjing Audit University; University of Technology Sydney
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaa002
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 976-1007
• 关键词: Information disclosure; product; QUALITY; example

摘要

This article investigates how a privately informed seller could signal her type through Bayesian persuasion and pricing strategy. We find that it is generally impossible to achieve separation through one channel alone. Furthermore, the outcome that survives the intuitive criterion always exists and is unique. This outcome is separating, for which a closed-form solution is provided. The signalling concern forces the high-type seller to disclose inefficiently more information and charge a higher price, resulting in fewer sales and lower profit. Finally, we show that a regulation on minimal quality could potentially hurt social welfare, and private information hurts the seller.