TAXATION OF TEMPORARY JOBS: GOOD INTENTIONS WITH BAD OUTCOMES?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cahuc, Pierre; Charlot, Olivier; Malherbet, Franck; Benghalem, Helene; Limon, Emeline
• 署名单位: CY Cergy Paris Universite; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; University of Lausanne
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/uez062
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 422-445
• 关键词: Employment protection; labor-markets; reforms; CONTRACTS; france; wage; term

摘要

This article analyses the consequences of the taxation of temporary jobs of short duration recently introduced in several European countries to induce firms to create more open-ended contracts and to increase the duration of jobs. The estimation of a job search and matching model on French data shows that the taxation of temporary jobs does not reach its objectives: it reduces the mean duration of jobs and decreases job creation, employment and welfare of unemployed workers.