SECESSION WITH NATURAL RESOURCES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dhillon, Amrita; Krishnan, Pramila; Patnam, Manasa; Perroni, Carlo
• 署名单位: University of Warwick; University of London; King's College London; University of Oxford; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaa033
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 2207-2248
• 关键词: institutions; matter

摘要

We look at the formation of new Indian states in 2001 to uncover the effects of political secession on the comparative economic performance of natural resource rich and natural resource poor areas. Resource rich constituencies fared comparatively worse within new states that inherited a relatively larger proportion of natural resources. We argue that these patterns reflect how political reorganisation affected the quality of state governance of natural resources. We describe a model of collusion between state politicians and resource rent recipients that can account for the relationships we see in the data between natural resource abundance and post-break-up local outcomes.