ON THE PACIFIC SALMON TREATY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jiang, Shenzhe; Zhang, Yuzhe
• 署名单位: Peking University; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Peking University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/uez058
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 489-510
• 关键词: Repeated games; collusion

摘要

This article studies the optimal design of the Pacific Salmon Treaty, which was signed by the USA and Canada in 1999 to share salmon on the Pacific coast. Moral hazard exists because countries may steal from each other. If a country's observed output is suspiciously too high, the treaty either reduces the country's future share, or asks the country to make a monetary transfer to its opponent. A calibrated version of our model shows that it is optimal for the USA to pay Canada $328.93 million every 30.78 years. Switching to the optimal contract improves the total welfare by 1.55%.