ITERATIVE VERSUS STANDARD DEFERRED ACCEPTANCE: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bo, Inacio; Hakimov, Rustamdjan
• 署名单位: University of York - UK; University of Lausanne
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/uez036
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 356-392
• 关键词: School choice; college admissions; INFORMATION; mechanisms; auctions; BEHAVIOR; IMPACT

摘要

We test experimentally the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance mechanism versus two versions of the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism, in which students make applications one at a time. A significantly higher proportion of stable outcomes is reached under Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism than under Deferred Acceptance. The difference can be explained by a higher proportion of subjects following an equilibrium truthful strategy under iterative mechanisms than the dominant strategy of truthful reporting under Deferred Acceptance. We associate the benefits of iterative mechanisms with the feedback on the outcome of the previous application that they provide to students between steps.