LAME DUCKS AND LOCAL FISCAL POLICY: QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM PORTUGAL

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: da Fonseca, Mariana Lopes
• 署名单位: University of St Gallen; Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/uez042
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 511-533
• 关键词: Electoral accountability; term limits; performance; politicians; bureaucrats; choices; voters

摘要

I use the introduction of mayoral term limits in Portugal to identify how an exogenous variation in eligibility for office affects policy decisions. Relying on a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences approach, I find that term-limited incumbents pursue more conservative fiscal policies than those who are eligible for re-election. Heterogeneous effects show that the treatment effects primarily reflect the behaviour of right-leaning, term-limited incumbents. Results are in line with a model in which right-leaning officeholders try to maintain a good reputation by pleasing an electorate prone to redistribution while they are eligible, but adopt policies closer to their true preferences when term limited.