ARMS RACES AND CONFLICT: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Abbink, Klaus; Dong, Lu; Huang, Lingbo
• 署名单位: Monash University; Nanjing Audit University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaa096
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1883-1904
• 关键词: bertrand competition; nuclear-weapons; backward induction; deterrence; PEACE; entry; TRADE; interdependence; INFORMATION; game

摘要

We study escalation and aggression in an experimental first-strike game in which two participants play multiple rounds of a money-earning task. In each round, both players can spend money to accumulate weapons. The player with more weapons can spend money to strike against the other player, which almost totally eliminates the victim's earnings potential and removes their capacity to strike. Weapons can serve as a means of deterrence. In four treatments, we find that deterrence is strengthened if weapon stocking cannot be observed, that a balance of power is effective in maintaining peace, and that mutually beneficial trade decreases the risk of confrontation, but not necessarily the likelihood of costly arms races.