VOTE TRADING IN POWER-SHARING SYSTEMS: A LABORATORY INVESTIGATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tsakas, Nikolas; Xefteris, Dimitrios; Ziros, Nicholas
• 署名单位: University of Cyprus
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaa105
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1849-1882
• 关键词: Market game; equilibrium; EXISTENCE; MODEL; institutions; COMPETITION; EFFICIENCY; platforms; commodity; ELECTIONS

摘要

Vote trading in power-sharing systems-i.e., systems in which a voter's utility with respect to the election's outcome is proportional to the vote share of her favourite party-is, in theory, welfare improving. However, trading votes for money in majoritarian systems may have detrimental welfare effects, especially when voters' preference intensities are similar (Casella et al., 2012). We use a laboratory experiment to test the effect of vote trading in each of these popular electoral systems on voter welfare and find strong evidence in support of the above intuitions: vote trading in power-sharing systems boosts aggregate welfare across all considered specifications, but it is not welfare improving in majoritarian systems. Importantly, and contrary to theoretical predictions, a substantial share of subjects consistently loses from vote trading even in power-sharing systems, indicating that its welfare effects are not unambiguous.