MULTI-TASK AGENTS AND INCENTIVES: THE CASE OF TEACHING AND RESEARCH FOR UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: De Philippis, Marta
• 署名单位: European Central Bank; Bank of Italy
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaa119
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1643-1681
• 关键词: high wage workers; student-achievement; teachers; performance; QUALITY; IMPACT; dismissal; schools; BIAS; firm

摘要

This paper exploits a natural experiment to study the effects of providing stronger research incentives to faculty members on universities' average teaching and research performance. The results indicate that professors are induced to reallocate effort from teaching towards research. Moreover, tighter research requirements affect the faculty composition, as they lead lower-research-ability professors to leave. Given the estimated positive correlation between teaching and research ability, those who leave are also characterized by lower teaching ability. The average effect on teaching for the university is therefore ambiguous, as positive composition effects countervail effort substitution.