A CHARACTERISATION OF 'PHELPSIAN' STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico
署名单位：
Georgetown University; California Institute of Technology
刊物名称：
ECONOMIC JOURNAL
ISSN/ISSBN：
0013-0133
DOI：
10.1093/ej/ueaa107
发表日期：
2021
页码：
2018-2032
关键词：
摘要：
We establish that a type of statistical discrimination-that based on informativeness of signals about workers' skills and the ability appropriately to match workers to tasks-is possible if and only if it is impossible uniquely to identify the signal structure observed by an employer from a realised empirical distribution of skills. The impossibility of statistical discrimination is shown to be equivalent to the existence of a fair, skill-dependent, remuneration for workers. Finally, we connect the statistical discrimination literature to Bayesian persuasion, establishing that if discrimination is absent, then the optimal signalling problem results in a linear pay-off function (as well as a kind of converse).