ELECTIONS IN NON-DEMOCRACIES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Egorov, Georgy; Sonin, Konstantin
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; University of Chicago; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaa123
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1682-1716
• 关键词: regime change; COORDINATION; institutions; disclosure; protest; media; game

摘要

Free and fair elections are the cornerstone of a democratic system, but elections are common in other regimes as well. Such an election might be a pure farce, with the incumbents getting close to 100% of the vote. In other instances, incumbents allow opposition candidates to be on the ballot and run campaigns, limit electoral fraud, e.g., by inviting international observers, all to make elections appear fair. In our model, the incumbent is informed about his popularity, and having a fair election allows him to signal his popularity to the people. After casting their vote, heterogeneous citizens decide whether or not to participate in a protest, and they are more willing to do so if they expect others to protest as well. We demonstrate theoretically that regimes that have a high level of elite repression are less likely to have fair elections, but regimes with a high cost of protesting for ordinary citizens make fair elections more likely.