AUSTERITY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Dellas, Harris; Niepelt, Dirk
署名单位：
University of Bern; Study Center Gerzensee
刊物名称：
ECONOMIC JOURNAL
ISSN/ISSBN：
0013-0133
DOI：
10.1093/ej/ueaa101
发表日期：
2021
页码：
697-712
关键词：
摘要：
We study the optimal debt and investment decisions of a sovereign with private information. The separating equilibrium is characterised by a cap on the current account. A sovereign repays debt amount due that exceeds default costs in order to signal creditworthiness and smooth consumption. Accepting funding conditional on investment/reforms relaxes borrowing constraints, even when investment does not create collateral, but it depresses current consumption. The model contains the signalling elements emphasised by creditors in the Greek austerity programmes and is consistent with the reduction in the loans issued by Greece and their interest rate following the 2015 election.
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