Economic efficiency requires interaction

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dobzinski, Shahar; Nisan, Noam; Oren, Sigal
• 署名单位: Weizmann Institute of Science; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.010
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 589-608
• 关键词: Combinatorial auctions; communication complexity

摘要

We study the necessity of interaction between individuals for obtaining approximately efficient economic allocations. We view this as a formalization of Hayek's classic point of view that focuses on the information transfer advantages that markets have relative to centralized planning. We study two settings: combinatorial auctions with unit demand bidders (bipartite matching) and combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders. In both settings we prove that non-interactive protocols require exponentially larger communication costs than do interactive ones, even ones that only use a modest amount of interaction. (C) 2018 Published by Elsevier Inc.