UPSTREAM BUNDLING AND LEVERAGE OF MARKET POWER

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Corniere, Alexandre; Taylor, Greg
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueab024
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 3122-3144
• 关键词: slotting allowances; COMPETITION; compatibility; CONTRACTS; Loyalty; demand; rent

摘要

We present a novel rationale for bundling in vertical relations. In many markets, upstream firms compete to be in the best downstream slots (e.g., the best shelf in a retail store or the default application on a platform). If a multi-product upstream firm faces competition for a subset of its products, we show that tying the monopolised product with the competitive ones can reduce upstream rivals' willingness to offer slotting fees to retailers. This strategy does not rely on entry deterrence and can be achieved through contractual or even virtual tying. The model is particularly relevant to the Google-Android case.