Comprehensive rationalizability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C.
• 署名单位: Open University Israel; University of Bath; University of California System; University of California Davis
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.002
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 185-202
• 关键词: Common assumption of rationality; Common belief in rationality; Iterated admissibility; rationalizability; Lexicographic belief systems

摘要

We present a new solution concept for strategic games called comprehensive rationalizability that embodies a new version of common cautious belief in rationality based on a sound epistemic characterization in a universal type space. Differently from existing iterative strategy elimination procedures in the literature, it should rather be viewed as an iterative strategy demotion procedure as it requires some memory of previously discarded strategies. It refines rationalizability, but it neither refines nor is refined by iterated admissibility. Nevertheless, it coincides with iterated admissibility in many relevant economic applications. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.