SCHOOL CHOICE DESIGN, RISK AVERSION AND CARDINAL SEGREGATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Calsamiglia, Caterina; Martinez-Mora, Francisco; Miralles, Antonio
• 署名单位: University of Leicester; Universidad Publica de Navarra; University of Messina; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaa095
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1081-1104
• 关键词: public-schools; benefit students; college admissions; COMPETITION; PRIVATE; teachers; vouchers; demand; equilibrium; preferences

摘要

We embed the problem of public school choice design in a model of local provision of education. We define cardinal (student) segregation as that emerging when families with identical ordinal preferences submit different rankings of schools in a centralised school choice procedure. With the Boston Mechanism (BM), when higher types are less risk-averse, and there is sufficient vertical differentiation of schools, any equilibrium presents cardinal segregation. Transportation costs facilitate the emergence of cardinal segregation as does competition from private schools. Furthermore, the latter renders the best public schools more elitist. The Deferred Acceptance mechanism is resilient to cardinal segregation.