RUN-OFF ELECTIONS IN THE LABORATORY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bouton, Laurent; Gallego, Jorge; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Morton, Rebecca
• 署名单位: Georgetown University; Universidad del Rosario; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; New York University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueab051
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 106-146
• 关键词: Electoral systems; divided majority; Plurality; polls; MODEL; COORDINATION; aggregation; COMPETITION; rules; LAW

摘要

We study experimentally the properties of the majority run-off system and compare them to those of plurality rule. Our focus is on Duverger's famous prediction that the plurality rule leads to higher co-ordination of votes on a limited number of candidates than the majority run-off rule. We find strong co-ordination forces under both systems. However, as predicted by the theory, in some cases these forces are stronger under plurality. Despite these differences in voting behaviour, we find small and mostly not significant differences in electoral outcomes and, hence, voters' welfare.