Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico*

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fergusson, Leopoldo; Larreguy, Horacio; Riano, Juan Felipe
• 署名单位: Universidad de los Andes (Colombia); Universidad de los Andes (Colombia); Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueac041
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 2815-2834
• 关键词: economy; institutions; CONFLICT; RIGHTS; REFORM; POLICY; VOTE; weak; WAR

摘要

We develop a model of the politics of state capacity building undertaken by incumbent parties that have a comparative advantage in clientelism rather than in public goods provision. The model predicts that, when challenged by opponents, clientelistic incumbents have the incentive to prevent investments in state capacity. We provide empirical support for the model's implications by studying policy decisions by the Institutional Revolutionary Party that affected local state capacity across Mexican municipalities and over time. Our difference-in-differences and instrumental variable identification strategies exploit a national shock that threatened the Mexican government's hegemony in the early 1960s.