THE VIRTUOUS CYCLE OF AGREEMENT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Louis, Philippos; Nunez, Matias; Xefteris, Dimitrios
• 署名单位: University of Cyprus; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueab057
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 326-360
• 关键词: cognitive-dissonance; dialectical inquiry; intragroup conflict; devils advocacy; COOPERATION; consensus; rules; preferences; COMPETITION; ELECTIONS

摘要

Collective choice mechanisms are used by groups to reach decisions in the presence of diverging preferences. But can the employed mechanism affect the degree of post-decision actual agreement (i.e., preference homogeneity) within a group? And if so, which are the features of the choice mechanisms that matter? Since it is difficult to address these questions in natural settings, we employ a theory-driven experiment where, after the group collectively decides on an issue, individual preferences can be properly elicited. We find that decision mechanisms that promote consensual behaviour generate substantially higher levels of post-decision actual agreement compared to outcome-wise identical procedures that incentivise subjects to exaggerate their differences.