Solving Becker's assortative assignments and extensions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Javier Martinez-de-Albeniz, F.; Rafels, Carlos; Ybern, Neus
• 署名单位: University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona; Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.005
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 248-261
• 关键词: Assortative market; assignment game; core; Nucleolus

摘要

We analyze assortative assignment games, introduced in Becker (1973) and Eriksson et al. (2000). We study the extreme core points and show an easy way to compute them. We find a natural solution for these games. It coincides with several well-known point solutions, the median stable utility solution (Schwarz and Yenmez, 2011) and the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969). We also analyze the behavior of the Shapley value. We finish with some extensions, where some hypotheses are relaxed. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.