MORAL HAZARD VERSUS LIQUIDITY AND THE OPTIMAL TIMING OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Campos, Rodolfo G.; Ignacio Garcia-Perez, J.; Reggio, Iliana
• 署名单位: Banco de Espana; Universidad Pablo de Olavide; Autonomous University of Madrid
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueac034
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 2674-2701
• 关键词: consumption

摘要

We develop a novel way of identifying the liquidity and moral hazard effects of unemployment insurance exclusively from how job-finding rates respond to unemployment benefits that vary over an unemployment spell. We derive a sufficient statistics formula for the dynamically optimal level of unemployment benefits based on these two effects. Using a regression kink design (RKD) that simultaneously exploits two kinks in the schedule of unemployment benefits, we apply our method to Spain for the years 1992-2012 and find that moral hazard effects dominated liquidity effects. suggesting that Spanish unemployment benefits exceeded the optimal level in that period.