Threat of Sabotage as a Driver of Collective Action

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: De Jaegher, Kris
• 署名单位: Utrecht University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueac023
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 2339-2365
• 关键词: weakest-link; voluntary provision; private provision; devils advocacy; public good; COMPETITION; incentives; dissent; games; shot

摘要

A model is presented where the welfare of contributors to a public good can increase when they face an adversary who ex post sabotages their efforts. It is a best response for the adversary to maximally sabotage the smallest effort, thus increasing a defector's marginal product of effort. This creates a kink in the individual contributor's payoff function around the equilibrium effort, which can lock contributors into exerting high effort. For a sufficiently large degree of complementarity between the contributors' efforts, the adversary increases contributors' welfare. This result is robust when departing from several simplifying assumptions of the model.