Strategic voting when participation is costly

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Xefteris, Dimitrios
• 署名单位: University of Cyprus
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.04.010
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 122-127
• 关键词: Multiparty elections; Plurality rule; Costly voting; Duverger's law; strategic voting

摘要

We study a general multiparty model of plurality rule elections with costly participation, and prove that strategic voting - that is, situations in which some voters abandon their most preferred alternative and vote strategically for the serious contender they dislike less - may emerge in equilibrium; just like when participation is costless/compulsory (Palfrey, 1989). This qualifies opposite claims made in more confined setups (e.g. Arzumanyan and Polborn, 2017), and establishes that Duverger's psychological effect is present in a much larger set of cases than currently believed. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.