Pledge-and-Review Bargaining: from Kyoto to Paris

• 成果类型: Review
• 署名作者: Harstad, Bard
• 署名单位: University of Oslo; University of Oslo
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueac076
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1181-1216
• 关键词: perfect equilibrium; climate policy; game; duration

摘要

A tractable dynamic model of international climate policies is analysed. The choice of bargaining game influences participation levels, emission quotas and technology investment levels. I derive several predictions that are arguably consistent with the differences between the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement-including the transitioning from the former to the latter.