Shifting Punishment onto Minorities: Experimental Evidence of Scapegoating

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bauer, Michal; Cahlikova, Jana; Chytilova, Julie; Roland, Gerard; Zelinsky, Tomas
• 署名单位: Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; University of Bonn; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; Technical University Kosice; Durham University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/uead005
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1626-1640
• 关键词: 3rd-party punishment; BIAS; DISCRIMINATION; RESPONSIBILITY; COOPERATION; aggression

摘要

Do members of a majority group systematically shift punishment onto innocent members of an ethnic minority? We introduce an experimental paradigm, punishing the scapegoat game, to measure how injustice affecting a member of one's own group shapes punishment of an unrelated bystander. When no harm is done, we find no evidence of discrimination against the ethnic minority (Roma people in Slovakia). In contrast, when a member of one's own group is harmed, the punishment 'passed' onto innocent individuals more than doubles when they are from the minority, as compared to when they are from the dominant group.