On the value of repetition for communication games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Meng, Delong
• 署名单位: Shanghai Jiao Tong University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.009
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 227-246
• 关键词: Dynamic mechanisms; Repeated communication; Rate Of Convergence

摘要

We study repeated communication between a long-run agent and a long-run principal. In each period the agent observes the state of the world - which is i.i.d. across time - and reports to the principal. The principal takes an action based on the history of the agent's reports and public randomization signals. We allow general state space, action space, and preferences. We characterize the set of possible payoffs for the principal and the agent as the discount factor goes to one. We also study the case when the discount factor is less than (but close to) one and analyze the rate of convergence to points on the frontier of the limit payoff set. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.