Building trust: The costs and benefits of gradualism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kartal, Melis; Mueller, Wieland; Tremewan, James
• 署名单位: Vienna University of Economics & Business; University of Vienna; Tilburg University; Tilburg University; University of Auckland
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.008
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 258-275
• 关键词: cooperation; trust; Infinitely repeated games; gradualism; game theory; experiments

摘要

We examine the prevalence of gradualist strategies and their effect on trust-building and economic gains in a setting with an infinite horizon, asymmetric information regarding the trustworthiness of receivers, and various levels of trust. The theoretical literature suggests that gradualist strategies mitigate asymmetric information problems and foster trust-building. However, we theoretically and experimentally show that gradualism sometimes reduces joint payoffs relative to a simple binary setting in which trust is an all-or-nothing decision. In a series of experiments, we vary the degree of asymmetric information as well as the economic returns to trusting behavior, and delineate circumstances under which gradualism may promote or curb efficiency. (C) 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.