Local global equivalence for unanimous social choice functions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kumar, Ujjwal; Roy, Souvik; Sen, Arunava; Yadav, Sonal; Zeng, Huaxia
• 署名单位: Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Umea University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.009
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 299-308
• 关键词: Local strategy-proofness; strategy-proofness; Unanimity

摘要

We identify a condition on preference domains that ensures that every locally strategy-proof and unanimous random social choice function is also strategy-proof. Furthermore every unanimous, locally strategy-proof deterministic social choice function is also group strategy-proof. The condition identified is significantly weaker than the characterization condition for local-global equivalence without unanimity in Kumar et al. (2020). The condition is not necessary for equivalence with unanimous random/deterministic social choice functions. However, we show the weaker condition of connectedness remains necessary. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.