Information Aggregation in Stratified Societies

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Agranov, Marina; Eilat, Ran; Sonin, Konstantin
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; National Bureau of Economic Research; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaf029
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Cheap talk; income; MODEL; INEQUALITY; character

摘要

We analyse a model of political competition in which the elite form endogenously to aggregate information and advise the uninformed median voter which candidate to choose. The median voter knows whether or not the endorsed candidate is biased toward the elites, but might still prefer the biased candidate if the elite's endorsement provides sufficient information about her competence. The elite size and the degree of information aggregation by the elite depend on the extent to which the median voter follows the elite's advice. A higher cost of redistribution minimises the elite's information advantage, hinders information transmission and decreases the expected competence of the elected politician.