Voting with interdependent values: The Condorcet winner

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gershkov, Alex; Kleiner, Andreas; Moldovanu, Benny; Shi, Xianwen
• 署名单位: Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Surrey; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Bonn; University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.004
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 193-208
• 关键词: Sequential voting; interdependent values; incomplete information; Condorcet winner

摘要

We generalize the standard, private values voting model with single-peaked preferences and incomplete information by introducing interdependent preferences. Our main results show how standard mechanisms that are outcome-equivalent and implement the Condorcet winner under complete information or under private values yield starkly different outcomes if values are interdependent. We also propose a new notion of Condorcet winner under incomplete information and interdependent preferences, and discuss its implementation. The new phenomena in this paper arise because different voting rules (including dynamic ones) induce different processes of information aggregation and learning. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.