Evolution and the ultimatum game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Akdeniz, Aslihan; van Veelen, Matthijs
• 署名单位: University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.005
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 570-612
• 关键词: Ultimatum game; fairness; Mutation-selection equilibrium; Quantal response equilibrium; COMMITMENT; Experimental evidence

摘要

In this paper we review, upgrade, and synthesize existing models from evolutionary game theory, all of which aim at explaining human behaviour in the ultimatum game. Our new and improved versions of Gale et al. (1995), Nowak et al. (2000), and Rand et al. (2013) avoid shortcomings that the original versions have, one of which is that the results in the first and the last are driven by bias in the mutations. We also compare the predictions of these three models with the existing experimental evidence by looking at properties of the distributions of minimal acceptable offers. We find that the observed distributions do not conform to the predictions from Gale et al. (1995), Rand et al. (2013), or any other model in which there is no fitness benefit to rejecting. This does not rule out commitment-based explanations, such as Nowak et al. (2000).(c) 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons .org /licenses /by /4 .0/).