Paying for what kind of performance? Performance pay, multitasking, and sorting in mission-oriented jobs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jones, Daniel B.; Tonin, Mirco; Vlassopoulos, Michael; Winichakul, K. Pun
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Free University of Bozen-Bolzano; Fondazione Bruno Kessler; FBK-IRVAPP - Research Institute for the Evaluation of Public Policies; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Bocconi University; University of Southampton; Smith College
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.002
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 480-507
• 关键词: Prosocial motivation; performance pay; multitasking; sorting

摘要

How does pay-for-performance (P4P) impact productivity and the composition of workers in mission-oriented jobs when output has multiple dimensions? This is a central issue in the public sector, particularly in areas such as education and health care. We conduct an experiment, manipulating compensation and prosocial elements of the job, to answer these questions. We find that P4P has significantly smaller positive effects on productivity on the incentivized dimension in the prosocial setting relative to the non-prosocial setting. On the other hand, P4P generates no loss in performance on the non-incentivized dimension of effort in the prosocial setting, whereas it does so in the non-prosocial setting. In both settings, P4P attracts higher ability workers, but it does so at the expense of attracting prosocially-motivated workers in the prosocial setting.(c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.