Ex-post implementation with interdependent values ☆

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Goyal, Saurav; Narayanan, Aroon
• 署名单位: Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.002
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 440-453
• 关键词: Ex -post implementation; Interdependent value auction; Eventual monotonicity; Optimal auction

摘要

We characterize ex-post implementable allocation rules for single object auctions under quasi-linear preferences with interdependent value functions. We show that requiring ex -post implementability is equivalent to requiring a weakening of monotonicity, which is a familiar condition used to characterize dominant strategy implementation. We illustrate that non-monotone rules may be necessary to achieve objectives such as efficiency and revenue maximizations, even in standard models such as the maximum signal model studied in Bulow and Klemperer (2002), and Bergemann et al. (2020).(c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.